Combining causal and similarity-based reasoning

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Abstract

Everyday inductive reasoning draws on many kinds of knowledge, including knowledge about causal relationships between properties and knowledge about similarity relationships between objects. Previous accounts of inductive reasoning generally focus on just one kind of knowledge: models of causal reasoning often focus on relationships between properties, and models of similarity-based reasoning often focus on similarity relationships between objects. We present a model of inductive reasoning that incorporates both kinds of knowledge. Two experiments show that our model makes accurate quantitative predictions in a task where subjects combine knowledge about causal relationships between properties with knowledge about similarity between biological species.

1 Introduction

Will that berry taste good? Is that table strong enough to sit on? Predicting whether an object has an unobserved property is among the most basic of all inductive problems, and attempts to understand how humans solve this problem have taken many different forms. Many kinds of knowledge appear to be relevant: different researchers emphasize the role of causal knowledge, similarity, category judgments, associations, analogical mappings, scripts, and intuitive theories, and each of these approaches accounts for an important subset of everyday inferences. Taken in isolation, however, each of these approaches is fundamentally limited. Humans draw on multiple kinds of knowledge and integrate them flexibly when required, and eventually our models should attempt to match this ability [1]. As an initial step towards this goal, we present a model of inductive reasoning that is sensitive both to causal relationships between properties and to similarity relationships between objects.

The inductive problem we consider can be formalized as the problem of filling in missing entries in an object-property matrix (Figure 1). Previous accounts of inductive reasoning generally address some version of this problem. Models of causal reasoning [2] usually focus on relationships between properties (Figure 1a): if animal A has wings, for instance, it is likely that animal A can fly. Similarity-based models [3, 4, 5] usually focus on relationships between objects (Figure 1b): if my pet duck carries gene X, my pet goose is probably more likely than my pet pig to carry the same gene. Previous models, however, cannot account for inferences that rely on similarity and causality: if my duck carries gene X and gene X causes enzyme Y to be expressed, it is likely that my goose expresses enzyme Y (Figure 1c). We develop a unifying model that handles inferences like this, and that subsumes previous probabilistic approaches to causal reasoning [2] and similarity-based reasoning [5, 6].

Unifying frameworks are often conceptually valuable even if they do not go beyond the models they subsume. Our model, however, addresses serious limitations of the two approaches it combines. Approaches that rely on causal graphical models typically assume that the feature vectors of any two objects (any two rows of the matrix in Figure 1a) are conditionally independent given a causal network over the features. Suppose, for example, that the rows of the matrix correspond to people, and that the causal network states that smoking leads to lung cancer with probability 0.3. Suppose that Tim, Tom and Xavier are smokers, that Tim and Tom are identical twins, and that Tim has lung




Figure 1: (a) Models of causal reasoning generally assume that feature vectors (rows of the matrix) are conditionally independent given the causal relationships between features. These models are often used to make predictions about unobserved features of novel objects. (b) Models of similarity-based reasoning generally assume that columns of the matrix are conditionally independent given a similarity structure over the objects. These models are often used to make predictions about the extensions of novel features. (c) We develop a generative model for object-feature matrices that incorporates causal relationships between the features and similarity relationships between the objects. The model uses both kinds of information to make predictions about matrices with missing entries.

cancer. The assumption of conditional independence implies that Tom and Xavier are equally likely to suffer from long cancer, a conclusion that seems unsatisfactory. The assumption is false because of variables that are unknown but causally relevant — variables capturing unknown biological and environmental factors that mediate the relationship between smoking and disease. Dealing with these unknown variables is difficult, but we suggest that knowledge about similarity between objects can help. Since Tim is more similar to Tom than Xavier, our model correctly predicts that Tom is more at risk than Xavier.

Previous models of similarity-based reasoning [5, 6] also suffer from a restrictive assumption of conditional independence. This time, the assumption states that features (columns of the matrix in Figure 1b) are conditionally independent given information about the similarity between objects. Empirical tests of similarity-based models often attempt to satisfy this assumption by using *blank properties*—subjects, for example, might be told that coyotes have property P, and asked to judge the probability that foxes have property P [3, 7]. To a first approximation, generalizations in tasks like this conform to judgments of similarity: subjects conclude, for example, that foxes are more likely to have property P than mice, since coyotes are more similar to foxes than mice. People, however, find it natural to reason about properties that are linked to familiar properties, and that therefore violate the assumption of conditional independence. Suppose, for instance, you learn that desert foxes have skin that is resistant to sunburn. It now seems that desert rats are more likely to share this property than arctic foxes, even though desert foxes are more similar in general to arctic foxes than to desert rats. Our model captures inferences like this by incorporating knowledge about relationships between properties: in this case, having sunburn-resistant skin is linked to the property of living in the desert.

Limiting assumptions of conditional independence can be avoided by specifying a joint distribution on an entire object-property matrix. Our model uses a distribution that is sensitive to both causal relationships between properties and similarity relationships between objects. We know of no previous models that attempt to combine causality and similarity, and one set of experiments that has been taken to suggest that people find it difficult to combine these sources of information [8]. After introducing our model, we present two experiments designed to test it. The results suggest that people are able to combine causality with similarity, and that our model accounts well for this capacity.

2 A generative model for object-feature matrices

Assume that S_o is an object structure: a graphical model that captures relationships between a known set of objects (Figure 1b). Suppose, for instance, that the objects include a mouse, a rat, a squirrel and a sheep (o_1 through o_4). S_o can be viewed as a graphical model that captures phylogenetic relationships, or as a formalization of the intuitive similarity between these animals. Given some

feature of interest, the feature values for all objects can be collected into an object vector v_o and S_o specifies a distribution $P(v_o)$ on these vectors.

We work with the case where (S_o, λ) is a tree-structured graphical model of the sort previously used by methods for Bayesian phylogenetics [9] and cognitive models of property induction [5, 6]. The objects lie at the leaves of the tree, and we assume that object vectors are binary vectors generated by a mutation process over the tree. This process has a parameter, λ , that represents the base rate of a novel feature — the expected proportion of objects with that feature. If λ is low, (S_o, λ) might predict that a novel feature will probably not be found in any of the animals, but that if the feature does occur in exactly two of the animals, the mouse and the rat are a more likely pair than the mouse and the sheep. Similarly, if λ is set to 0.5, (S_o, λ) might predict that about half the animals will have the feature, but again the mouse and the rat are more likely to share the same feature value than the mouse and the sheep.

The mutation process can be formalized as a continuous-time Markov chain with two states (off and on), and with infinitesimal matrix:

$$Q = \left[\begin{array}{cc} -\lambda & \lambda \\ 1 - \lambda & -(1 - \lambda) \end{array} \right]$$

The stationary distribution of this Markov chain is $[1 - \lambda, \lambda]$ — in other words, the proportion of time spent in the second state (the on state) is represented by the parameter λ . We can generate object vectors from this model by imagining a binary feature spreading out over the tree from root to leaves. At the root, we sample a state from the stationary distribution, and the feature could switch values at any point along any branch. The parameter λ determines how easy it is to move between the on state and the off state. If λ is high, it will be easy for the Markov chain to enter the on state, and difficult for it to leave once it is there.

Assume now that S_f is a feature structure: a graphical model that captures relationships between a known set of features (Figure 1a). The features, for instance, may correspond to enzymes, and S_f may capture the causal relationships between these enzymes. One possible structure states that enzyme f_1 is involved in the production of enzyme f_2 , which is in turn involved in the production of enzyme f_3 . The feature values for any given object can be collected into a feature vector v_f and S_f specifies a distribution $P(v_f)$ on these vectors.

Suppose now that we want to develop a model that combines the knowledge represented by S_f and S_o (Figure 1c). Given that the mouse expresses enzyme f_1 , for instance, a combined model should predict that rats are more likely than squirrels to express enzyme f_2 . Formally, we seek a distribution P(M), where M is an object-feature matrix, and P(M) is sensitive to both the relationships between features and the relationships between animals. Given this distribution, Bayesian inference can be used to make predictions about the missing entries in a partially observed matrix.

Consider first the case where all the features happen to be independent (Figure 1b). Since the features are independent, we can assume that column i of the matrix is generated by (S_o, λ_i) , where λ_i is the base rate of f_i . Consider now the case where S_f captures causal relationships between the features (Figure 1c). Even though the features in S_f are no longer independent, in many cases these features will be determined by variables that can be assumed to be independent. The features of an animal, for example, are often ultimately determined by the genes of that animal, and even though high-level features may be far from independent (creatures with wings often fly), we can assume to a first approximation that genes are independently generated over a phylogeny. This biological argument motivates two psychological claims that should apply beyond the context of biological reasoning. First, we suggest that people are causal determinists [10]: given an apparently probabilistic relationship between a set of features (e.g. enzyme f_1 and enzyme f_2) people assume that these features are deterministically specified by a set of unknown root variables. Second, although little is known about the root variables, people realize that they are likely to respect the object structure S_o : for example, the unknown variables that mediate the relationship between f_1 and f_2 are more likely to take the same values in the mouse and the rat than in the mouse and the sheep.

We formalize these psychological claims by converting a probabilistic model S_f (Figure 2a) into an equivalent model S_f^D (Figure 2b) that uses a deterministic combination of independent random variables. In Figure 2b, for example, the model S_f^D indicates that the effect e is deterministically present if the cause e is present and the transmission mechanism e is active, or if there is an alternative




Figure 2: (a) A graphical model S_f that captures a probabilistic relationship between a cause c and an effect e. (b) A model S_f^D that is equivalent to S_f . t indicates whether the mechanism of causal transmission between c and e is active, and b indicates whether e is true independently of c. All of the root variables (c, t and b) are independent, and the remaining variables (e) are deterministically specified once the root variables are fixed. (c) A graphical model created by combining S_f^D with a tree-structured representation of the similarity between three objects. The root variables in S_f^D (c, t, and b) are independently generated over the tree. Note that the arrows on the edges of the combined model have been suppressed.

cause b that activates e. The model S_f^D is equivalent to S_f in the sense that both models induce the same distribution over the variables that appear in S_f . Of the many models S_f^D that meet this condition, we attempt to choose the simplest. Given a commitment to a specific deterministic model, we now assume that the root variables in S_f^D are independently generated over S_o . More precisely, suppose that the base rate of the ith variable in S_f^D is λ_i . The distribution P(M) we seek must meet two conditions (note that each candidate matrix M now has a column for each variable in S_f^D). First, the marginal distribution on each row must match the distribution specified by S_f^D . Second, if f_i is a root variable in S_f^D , the marginal distribution on column i must match the distribution specified by (S_o, λ_i) .

There is precisely one distribution P(M) that satisfies these conditions, and we can represent it using a graphical model that we call the combined model. Suppose that there are n objects in S_o . To create the combined model, we first introduce n copies of S_f^D . For each root variable i in S_f^D , we now connect all copies of variable i according to the structure of S_o (Figure 2c). The resulting graph provides the topology of the combined model, and the conditional probability distributions (CPDs) are inherited from S_o and S_f^D . Each node that belongs to the ith copy of S_o inherits a CPD from (S_o, λ_i) , and all remaining nodes inherit a (deterministic) CPD from S_f . Now that the distribution P(M) is represented as a graphical model, standard inference techniques can be used to compute the missing entries in a partially-observed matrix M. All results in this paper were computed using the implementation of the junction tree algorithm included in the Bayes Net toolbox [11].

3 Experiments

When making inductive inferences, a rational agent should exploit all of the information available, including causal relationships between features and similarity relationships between objects. Whether humans are able to meet this normative standard is not clear, and almost certainly varies from task to task. On one hand, there are motivating examples like the case of the three smokers where it seems natural to think about causal relationships and similarity relationships at the same time. On the other hand, Rehder [8] argues that causal information tends to outweigh similarity information when both are available, and supports this conclusion with data from several tasks involving artificial categories. To help resolve these competing views, we designed several tasks where subjects were required to simultaneously reason about causal relationships between enzymes and similarity relationships between animals.

3.1 Experiment 1

Materials and Methods. 16 adults participated in this experiment. Subjects were asked to reason about the presence of enzymes in a set of four animals: a mouse, a rat, a sheep, and a squirrel.




Figure 3: Experiment 1: Behavioral data (column 1) and predictions for three models. (a) Results for the chain condition. Known test results are marked with arrows: in task 1, subjects were told only that the mouse had tested positive for f_1 , and in the second task they were told in addition that the rat had tested negative for f_2 . Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. (b) Results for the common-effect condition.

Each subject was trained on two causal structures, each of which involved three enzymes. Pseudobiological names like "dexotase" were used in the experiment, but here we will call the enzymes f_1 , f_2 and f_3 . In the chain condition, subjects were told that f_3 is known to be produced by several pathways, and that the most common pathway begins with f_1 , which stimulates production of f_2 , which in turn leads to the production of f_3 . In the common-effect condition, subjects were told that f_3 is known to be produced by several pathways, and that one of the most common pathways involves f_1 and the other involves f_2 .

To reinforce each causal structure, subjects were shown 20 cards representing animals from twenty different mammal species (names of the species were not supplied). The card for each animal represented whether that animal had tested positive for each of the three enzymes. The cards were chosen to be representative of the distribution captured by a causal network with known structure (chain or common-effect) and known parameterization. In the chain condition, for example, the network was a noisy-or network with the form of a chain, where leak probabilities were set to 0.4 (f_1) or 0.3 (f_2) and (f_3) , and the probability that each causal link was active was set to 0.7. After subjects had studied the cards for as long as they liked, the cards were removed and subjects were asked several questions about the enzymes (e.g. "you learn about a new mammal — how likely is it that the mammal produces (f_3) ") The questions in this training phase were intended to encourage subjects to reflect on the causal relationships between the enzymes.

In both conditions, subjects were told that they would be testing the four animals (mouse, rat, sheep and squirrel) for each of the three enzymes. Each condition included two tasks. In the chain condition, subjects were first told that the mouse had tested positive for f_1 , and asked to predict the outcome of each remaining test (Figure 1c). Subjects were then told in addition that the rat had tested negative for f_2 , and again asked to predict the outcome of each remaining test. Note that this second task requires subjects to integrate causal reasoning with similarity-based reasoning: causal reasoning predicts that the mouse has f_2 , and similarity-based reasoning predicts that it does not. Ratings were provided on a scale from 0 (very likely to test negative) to 100 (very likely to test positive). In the common-effect condition, subjects were first told that the mouse had tested positive for f_3 , then told in addition that the rat had tested negative for f_2 .

Results. We found that subjects used the 100 point scale very differently: in task 1 of each condition, some subjects chose numbers between 80 and 100, and others chose numbers between 0 and 100. We therefore converted each set of ratings to z-scores. Average z-scores are shown in the first row of Figure 3. The remaining rows of Figure 3 show predictions for several models. In each case, model predictions have been converted from probabilities to z-scores to allow a direct comparison with the human data.

Our combined model uses a tree over the four animals and a causal network over the features. We used the tree shown in Figure 1b, where objects o_1 through o_4 correspond to the mouse, the rat, the squirrel and the sheep. The tree component of our model has one free-parameter — the total path length of the tree. The smaller the path length, the more likely it will be that all four animals have the same feature values, and the greater the path length, the more likely that distant animals in the tree (e.g. the mouse and the sheep) will have different feature values. All results reported here use the same value of this parameter — the value that maximizes the average correlation achieved by our model across Experiments 1 and 2. The causal component of our model includes no free parameters: we used the parameters of the network that generated the cards shown to subjects during the training phase. Comparing the first two columns of Figure 3, we see that our combined model accounts well for the human data.

Columns 3 and 4 of Figure 3 show model predictions when we remove the similarity component (column 3) or the causal component (column 4) from our combined model. The model that uses the causal network alone is described by [2], among others, and the model that uses the tree alone is described by [6]. Both of these models miss out on qualitative trends evident in the human data. In task 1 of each condition, the causal model makes identical predictions about the rat, the squirrel and the sheep: in task 1 of the chain condition, for example, it cannot use the similarity between the mouse and the rat to predict that the rat is also likely to test positive for f_1 . In task 1 of each condition the similarity model predicts that the unobserved features (f_2 and f_3 for the chain condition, and f_1 and f_2 for the common-effect condition) are distributed identically across the four animals. In task 1 of the chain condition, for example, the similarity model does not predict that the mouse is more likely than the sheep to test positive for f_2 and f_3 .

The limitations of the causal and similarity models suggest that some combination of causality and similarity is necessary to account for the human data. There should be approaches other than our combined model that account well for the human data, but we suggest that accurate predictions will only be achieved when the causal network and the similarity information are tightly integrated. Simply averaging the predictions for the causal model and the similarity model will not suffice: in task 1 of the chain condition, for example, both of these models predict that the rat and the sheep are equally likely to test positive for f_2 , and computing an average across these models will result in the same prediction.

3.2 Experiment 2

Experiment 1 provides strong evidence that humans are sensitive to both causal relationships between features and similarity relationships between objects. Our working hypothesis is that similarity and causality should be combined in all contexts. An alternative hypothesis — the *root variables* hypothesis — was suggested to us by Bob Rehder, and states that similarity relationships are used only if some of the root variables in a causal structure are unobserved. The case of the three smokers provides intuitive evidence against this hypothesis — even though the root variable is observed for Tim, Tom and Xavier (all three are smokers), we still believe Tom is more likely to suffer from lung cancer than Xavier having discovered that Tim has lung cancer. We tested this hypothesis empirically using a second experiment that includes tasks analogous to the case of the three smokers.

Materials and Methods. Our second experiment was similar to Experiment 1, except that the common-effect condition was replaced by a common-cause condition. In the first task for each condition, subjects were told only that the mouse had tested positive for f_1 . In the second task, subjects were told in addition that the rat, the squirrel and the sheep had tested positive for f_1 , and that the mouse had tested negative for f_2 . Note that in the second task, values for the root variable (f_1) are provided for all animals. 18 adults participated in this experiment.

Results. Figure 4 shows mean z-scores for the subjects and for the four models described previously. The judgments for the first task in each condition replicate the finding from Experiment 1 that subjects use both causality and similarity when given a feature value for just one of the 12 possible




Figure 4: Experiment 2: Behavioral data and predictions for three models. In task 2 of each condition, the root variable in the causal network (f_1) is observed for all four animals.

(animal, feature) pairs. The results for the second task rule out the root-variables hypothesis. In the chain condition, for example, the causal model predicts that the rat and the sheep are equally likely to test positive for f_2 . Subjects predict that the rat is less likely than the sheep to test positive for f_2 , and our combined model accounts for this prediction.

The root-variables hypothesis does not account well for our data, but should be correct in cases where all root variables in the true causal structure are known. The true causal structure, however, may include root variables that are almost never observed. Compare, for instance, the networks in Figures 2a and 2b. The probabilistic network in Figure 2a has only one root variable, but the network in 2b captures the idea that the stochastic nature of 2a depends on other, unobserved root variables. Even if cause c is directly observed, variables like t and t0 represent variables that are unobserved and perhaps unknown, and similarity is useful for making inferences about the effects of these variables.

4 Discussion

We developed a model of inductive reasoning that is sensitive to causal relationships between features and similarity relationships between objects, and demonstrated in two experiments that it provides a good account of human reasoning. Our model makes three contributions. First, it provides an integrated view of two inductive problems — causal reasoning and similarity-based reasoning — that are usually considered separately. Second, unlike previous accounts of causal reasoning, our model acknowledges the importance of unknown but causally relevant variables, and uses similarity to constrain inferences about the effects of these variables. Third, unlike previous models of similarity-based reasoning, our model can handle novel properties that are causally linked to known properties.

For expository convenience we have emphasized the distinction between causality and similarity, but the notion of similarity needed by our framework will often have a causal interpretation. A tree-structured taxonomy, for example, is a simple representation of the causal process that generated biological species — the process of evolution. From this perspective, our combined model is a causal model that takes both relationships between features and evolutionary relationships between species into account. More generally, our framework can be seen as a method for building sophisticated causal models, and our experiments suggest that these kinds of models will be needed to account for the complexity and subtlety of human causal reasoning.

Other researchers have proposed strategies for combining probabilistic models have been proposed [12, 13], and some of these methods may account well for our data. In particular, the product-of-experts approach [13] should lead to predictions that are qualitatively similar to the predictions of our combined model. A product of experts model, however, is not a directed graphical model, and cannot be given a simple causal interpretation. Our approach may therefore be preferred as a computational theory of inductive reasoning. In the case of biological reasoning, for example, the generative assumptions of our model are a rough approximation of the process by which biological properties are generated in the world.

Causal knowledge and similarity are just two of the many varieties of knowledge that support inductive reasoning. Any single form of knowledge is a worthy topic of study, but everyday inferences often draw upon multiple kinds of knowledge. We have not provided a recipe for combining arbitrary forms of knowledge, but our work illustrates some general themes that may apply quite broadly. First, different generative models may capture different aspects of human knowledge, but all of these models use a common language: the language of probability. Probabilistic models are modular, and can be composed in many different ways to build integrated models of inductive reasoning. Second, the stochastic component of most generative models is in part an expression of ignorance. Using one model (e.g. a similarity model) to constrain the stochastic component of another model (e.g. a causal network) may be a relatively general method for combining probabilistic knowledge representations.

Although we have focused on human reasoning, integrated models of induction are needed in many scientific fields. Our combined model may find applications in computational biology: predicting whether an organism expresses a certain gene, for example, should rely on phylogenetic relationships between organisms and causal relationships between genes. Related models have already been explored: Engelhardt et al. [14] develop an approach to protein function prediction that uses phylogenetic relationships between proteins and ontological knowledge about relationships between protein functions, and several authors have explored models that combine phylogenies with hidden Markov models. Combining two or three models is only a small step towards a fully integrated approach, but further progress can be made by continuing to rely on probability as a *lingua franca* for combining multiple representations of the world.

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